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OPINION** 
________________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge 
Mark Sanders appeals his judgment of conviction following a jury trial. We will 
affirm.  
I1 
 Sanders was convicted of four crimes arising out of his participation in a theft at 
gunpoint of a Suzuki dirt bike. Most pertinent to this appeal are his convictions for 
conspiracy to commit robbery of a motor vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 
aiding and abetting the robbery of a motor vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119. 
Sanders raises three challenges on appeal: (1) the Government constructively amended 
his indictment; (2) the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him; and (3) the 
District Court admitted irrelevant evidence. We consider each argument in turn.  
 
                                              
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
3 
 
 
A 
 The crux of Sanders’s first claim—that the Government constructively amended 
his indictment—is based on this syllogism: (1) Sanders was indicted for stealing a Suzuki 
dirt bike that traveled in interstate commerce; (2) although the Government offered 
evidence that the dirt bike traveled in foreign commerce (from Japan to the United 
States), it offered no evidence that the dirt bike traveled in interstate commerce; 
therefore, (3) Sanders was convicted of a crime for which he was never indicted. See 
Sanders Br. 33–34, 37–46. 
 At first glance, this syllogism makes sense. It ultimately fails, however, because 
the phrase “interstate or foreign commerce” as used in § 2119 is a unitary concept that 
requires the Government to prove only that the motor vehicle traveled in either interstate 
or foreign commerce. 
A constructive amendment occurs when a defendant is deprived of his “substantial 
right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury.” 
United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 148 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Miller, 
471 U.S. 130, 140 (1985)). An indictment is constructively amended when “the evidence 
and jury instructions at trial modify essential terms of the charged offense [such] that 
there is a substantial likelihood that the jury may have convicted the defendant for an 
offense differing from the offense the indictment returned by the grand jury actually 
charged.” United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259–60 (3d Cir. 2006).  
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The statute at issue in this appeal—18 U.S.C. § 2119—provides that one may be 
convicted if a motor vehicle was transported in interstate or foreign commerce. So long 
as a motor vehicle enters the State from elsewhere, the “interstate or foreign commerce” 
element of the offense is satisfied. Thus, the Government’s evidence that the Suzuki dirt 
bike traveled in foreign commerce did not “modify essential terms of the charged offense 
[such] that there is a substantial likelihood that the jury may have convicted” Sanders of 
an offense different from the one in the indictment. Daraio, 445 F.3d at 259–60. The 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion when it considered 
similar language in another criminal statute. See United States v. Young, 730 F.2d 221, 
224 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding “interstate or foreign commerce” was a “unitary” concept in 
18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1)); see also United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d 1000, 1003–04 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (the same in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)), overruled on other grounds by Kawashima 
v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2008).  
Against the text of § 2119 and these precedents, Sanders relies principally on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960). There, an 
indictment accused the defendant of interfering with interstate commerce through the 
shipment of sand, but the Government proved only that he had shipped steel. Id. at 217. 
The Supreme Court held that this difference unconstitutionally broadened the indictment: 
“when only one particular kind of commerce is charged to have been burdened[,] a 
conviction must rest on that charge and not another, even though it be assumed that under 
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an indictment drawn in general terms a conviction might rest upon a showing that 
commerce of one kind or another had been burdened.” Id. at 218.  
Stirone is inapposite to Sanders’s case. The statute at issue prohibited, inter alia, 
“obstruct[ing] . . . the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by . . . 
extortion . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Because there was no evidence that the defendant 
moved sand, he was convicted of moving a different commodity (steel) than the one for 
which he was indicted. Here, Sanders was indicted for conspiracy to rob a Suzuki dirt 
bike and the proof at trial showed that a Suzuki dirt bike (not a Honda sedan, for 
example) was stolen. See Young, 730 F.2d at 224 (“Mr. Young was not indicted for 
receiving one particular firearm and then convicted for receiving another. The factual 
basis for the indictment is identical to that for the conviction. . . . Stirone [is] not 
applicable.”).  
We also note that the Government’s proof neither surprised nor prejudiced 
Sanders. Long before trial, Sanders was aware that the Government intended to prove the 
jurisdictional element of § 2119 through evidence that Suzuki dirt bikes are made in 
Japan and that this Suzuki dirt bike entered Pennsylvania through travel in foreign 
commerce. Because the jurisdictional element of § 2119 is satisfied as long as the 
indictment charged either “interstate commerce” or “foreign commerce” (or both), the 
evidence proved either (or both), and the jury instructions included either (or both), 
Sanders was convicted of the offense for which he was indicted.  
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B 
Sanders next cites two reasons why the evidence was insufficient to support his 
conviction: (1) it failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he participated in the 
robbery; and (2) it did not establish that the dirt bike traveled in interstate commerce.  
Sanders’s first argument is unsupported by the record. He is correct that no 
witness specifically identified him and there was no physical evidence linking him to the 
crime. But as the District Court rightly noted, see App. 306, there was compelling 
circumstantial evidence that Sanders was a culprit, particularly under our deferential 
standard of review. See United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 
2013) (en banc). 
The second argument is foreclosed by our analysis of Sanders’s constructive 
amendment claim. Here again, he is correct that the indictment, jury instructions,2 and 
verdict slip all neglected to mention foreign commerce. Yet it is undisputed that the 
Government introduced expert testimony that the Suzuki dirt bike traveled in foreign 
commerce. App. 175, 296. Because “interstate or foreign commerce” is a unitary concept 
in § 2119, see supra Section I-A, this proof was sufficient to support Sanders’s 
conviction. 
                                              
2  Perhaps ironically, the Government requested jury instructions that tracked the 
statutory language, but the District Court acceded to Sanders’s request to delete “or 
foreign” from the instructions. App. 327–28. 
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C 
Sanders’s final argument is that the District Court erred by admitting, over his 
objection, Officer McAllister’s lay testimony about his familiarity with Suzuki 
motorcycles. Sanders argues that Officer McAllister’s knowledge about where his Suzuki 
motorcycles were manufactured was irrelevant to the question of where the Suzuki dirt 
bike in this case was manufactured. Sanders Br. 59. Assuming that the District Court 
abused its discretion in allowing this testimony, that error was harmless in light of the 
uncontroverted expert testimony that Suzuki motorcycles and dirt bikes were 
manufactured in Japan. App. 296. This fact established the interstate or foreign 
commerce nexus required by the statute. Accordingly, we think it “highly probable that 
the error did not affect the outcome of the case.” Moyer v. United Dominion Indus., Inc., 
473 F.3d 532, 545 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 349 (3d 
Cir. 2005)).  
II 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
